

"UNION DE LABOR NACIONALISTA"
(UNION OF NATIONAL LABOR)

THE "ALSACE-LORRAIN" QUESTION

OF

SOUTH AMERICA

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
OF

SOUTH AMERICA

**PATRIOTIC PROTEST OF THE
PERUVIAN SOCIETY CALLED
"UNION DE LABOR NACIONALISTA"
(UNION OF NATIONAL LABOR)**



Notable document showing Chile's sinister plan as regards Peru and the "lost provinces".





Notes:—Chile won the last war against Perú (1879-1883) taking as one of the conditions of peace, territory from Peru. This territory (Tacna and Arica) was to be returned to Peru, or to be incorporated definitely with Chile by a plebiscite vote at the end of ten years. Chile has always put obstacles to the realization of the plebiscite, and during the last few years, under its semi-military administration, Chile has practically control of the majority of the inhabitants. To attain this end, Peruvians resident in these lost provinces have been hostile, have been driven out of the region and told never to return, and the social and legal institutions have been dominated by the Chilean element completely. It is exactly a repetition of the German intervention in Alsace-Lorraine. Not

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only does the analogy stop here. These lost provinces are rich in nitrates, from which hundreds of millions of dollars worth have been taken, and from which Chile has reaped large revenues by way of export duties. The war indemnity of Germany in the Franco-Prussian War was no greater than that imposed by Chile against Peru in the war of 1879, by the virtual retention of Tacna and Arica, and her refusal to permit the plebiscite vote in 1893 (or thereafter), according to the treaty of peace of Ancon.

The following article deals with the desire of the National Union Society of Lima to have the treaty of Ancon denounced, and to secure the good offices of the United States Government in settling the matter in strict justice, and following out the doctrines of Monroe, Olney, Roosevelt, Root and Wilson.



If an analogy could be of any value we could begin with a comparison of Chile and Peru, as a second case of Germany and France. Due to the climatic and geographical conditions and to a goodly

immigration of German elements, Chile has constantly sought to dominate in South American politics and at the same time, extend its boundaries to the north and east. It has had, as a result, turmoils and disputes, with Argentine, Bolivia, an sspecially Peru.

Peru, on the other and, has a different set of problems. Its situation, climate and peoples have caused this country to resemble France in many ways. Its sympatnies are, and have been, for the French; its political organization is closely modled on the French type. It has sent its streams of students to France until recently, when American intellectual influence has increased. It has experimented with French educational systems before turning to German and American models. The history of the evolution of the social and political institutions of Peru is too long to relate here. Suffice it to say that much has been written on the matter by Cieza de Leon, Garcilazo de la Vega, Jorge Juan y Antonio Ulloa, Prescott, Lorente, Markham, Hiram Bingham, etc. The trend of these institutions has been to reveal Peruvian life as organically inteligent, labo-riouos, hospitable, but not Tarapacá resigned to major force, as in the case of the loss of Tacna and Ari-

ca. That was imposed by base intrigues and the arbitrary power of arms.

Chile, in order to carry out an imperialistic program, has had to apply secret diplomacy, with the false positions which it incurred, and when occasion arose, force has been employed to its advantage in different opportunities.

From the time of the Spanish domination in its South American colonies we note this tendency. Diego de Almagro showed his hatred to the Spanish Governor of Peru, terminating in the assassination of Francisco Pizarro. The feud was carried on to the era of independence in the 19th century. Even in the struggle for freedom, the Revolutionary Committee in Chile did not seek the most rapid means to bring about freedom, but rather sought that combination that would permit it to dominate Peru in order to form the Confederation of South America, creating thereby a balance of power to offset the sphere of influence of Anglo-Saxon America. Such was for example the "Great South-American Confederation" which the Supreme Dictator of Chile, Bernard O'Higgins recommended in his proclamation to the Chilean people on May 6, 1818.

As Peru was the principal center, in South

America, of Spanish domination, the struggles for freedom were more prolonged and more tenacious than elsewhere. Here it was easier to spy on the patriots, and control revolutionary movements from their inception. Peru, therefore, accepted only too readily help from without. General José de San Martín foresaw as early as 1814 the difficulties of combating the Spaniard with merely local elements in Peru; he undertook, as a consequence, the formation of an army in the province of Otuzco, and crossing the Andes, came first to Chile, insuring its freedom by the battles of Chacabuco and Maipú.

The Supreme Dictator of Chile, Bernardo O'Higgins, was asked by the Argentine Liberator, General San Martín, to strike a great and decisive blow against the stronghold of Spanish domination in Perú. O'Higgins offered a small number of men and vessels, on the following condition: that Peru on its proclamation of freedom from Spain, was to remain a protectorate of Chile.

General San Martín, after proclaiming Peru free independent on the 28th of July-1812-1821, assumed personally the position of Protector of Peru. Chile at once returned its troops and vessels, and

Admiral Cochrane (commander of the Patriot vessels) but acting from chilian side directed various communications (September 1821) of volatilenature against San Martín (1) Peru paid over four million pesos to Chile for this aid. Chile has used this entire incident to turn the facts, and say that it was her effort, and not that of Peruvians themselves that brought about the freedom of this country from the yokes of Spain. Even to-day, such statesmen in Chile, as the Walker Martínez, Blanlot Holley, Echenique, Péres Canto, etc. follow this sophistical form of argument, for purpose of villifying Peruvian efforts in the consort of nations, when in reality it all goes back to the attempt of Chile to dominate in South America, using Peru, as a cats-paw. How secret diplomacy does try to present apparent truths especially when they tend to further the imperialistic aims of a nation.

It seems that the great idea of President Wilson to erect a League of Nations, founded on the corner-stones of right and justice, has made it opportune indeed to unmask once and for all, these

(1) Other navy British and army officers of dignity and loyal conduc, Guise, Elmore, Miller, etc., preferred peruvian side.

Chilean diplomatic tactics, which have really harmed Peru in the eyes of other people. Suffice it to ask Chilean historians when and where the soldiers of the Chilean expedition for Peruvian freedom, aided in the battles, or fired a single shot before the proclamation of Peruvian freedom the 28th of July 1821 by San Martin. Nor did Chilean soldiers take part in the famous battles of Junin (August 6, 1824) or Ayacucho (December 9, 1824), the only real battle-fields, perhaps, of South-American liberty.

Scarcely had the independence of South American republics been established when each new nation sought to establish its boundaries with its neighbours. In the majority of cases this was done on the basis of the «Utti-possidetis» of 1810 as it is perhaps improperly called. In other words, the new republics were to retain the territory which belonged to the corresponding Spanish colonies in 1810—territory very poorly defined, and which since then has given rise to many disputes and ill-feeling between neighbours in South America.

The Bolivian Republic, as legal successor of the «Audiencia de Charcas» had therefore a right to the Pacific shores bathed by the region between the

Loa River toward Peru, and the Paposo River toward Chile. It should be noted here, that Bolivian economic energies were directed at this time to agriculture and mining in the higher altitudes, giving little relative importance to the desert region towards the Pacific coast. Chile, however, had quite a different economic problem. Due to the special condition of climate and a relative narrow strip of land, its inhabitants found most of their activities in agricultural pursuits, which did not produce any too large profits. As a result there was a considerable emigration of Chilean elements to neighboring sections of the countries. With the discovery of mineral wealth in Copiapo by John Godoy, many went to the Atacama desert, belonging to Bolivia. Here are to be found enormous deposits of copper, guano, nitrates, etc. A few Chilean families, employing preferably Chilean workmen, monopolized these mineral riches, and thereby, doubtless, aroused in Chile the desire to control this strip of territory. It seems to be a repetition of Germany and her desire to control directly the iron fields of Alsace and Lorraine—without which Germany could not have withstood so successfully the strain of the present Great War.

General Andrew Santa Cruz at that time repre-

sented the Peruvian Government as Plenipotenciary minister at Santiago de Chile. He noted the plans of the Chilean Government, and at once procured to form an alliance or confederation between Bolivia and Peru, in order to cheekmate Chile. To carry out her plan to divide Bolivia and Peru, the diplomacy of Diego Portales employed underhand means of fomenting civil wars and revolutions in these two republics with money furnished by Chile; Chilean statesmen offered Peruvian sea-ports to Bolivia (Arica an Islay); Chile celebrated at once a defensive and offensive alliance with the Argentine Republic; and by means of a Chilean invasion finally accomplished the breaking down of Santa Cruz's efforts to form a confederation between Bolivia and Peru. Chile did not stop here. She virtually caused distrust to be fomented between these two republics, terminating with the disaster of November 18, 1841.

As a result, Chile by law of October 31, 1842 declared national property the guano deposits of the litoral of Atacama, along the coast and adjacent islands of this province.

The year following, and of course without loss of time, Chile took possession of the Straits of Ma-

gellan, together with the adjacent territory (September 21, 1843). The law of 1842, taking Bolivian territory and property, caused diplomatic difficulties which Chile kept going by dilatory tactics. With the Argentine, however, there was a protest immediately; but somehow or other, Chile was able to keep the diplomatic discussions going until 1855 when it was agreed by treaty that both nations recognized as limits the territories they possessed as colonies of Spain in 1810, leaving the solution of all questions arising therefrom for settlement at a later date. Here, clearly is a victory for Chilean diplomacy! Chile kept the diplomatic ball rolling as regards Bolivian protests for years, meanwhile keeping tight possession of what she had already secured. She also attempted to hoist the Chilean flag in Angamos and the frigate Chile, by force, took Chilean citizens from the Bolivian tribunal of justice in Cobija. In 1857, the Chilean warship, Esmeralda, also attempted to exercise acts of sovereignty in the Bolivian territory of Atacama.

Bolivia finally tired of the Chilean diplomacy dilatoriness, and in 1861 assumed a threatening attitude. The Bolivian Congress authorized the executive to declare war on Chile, should it be impossible

to arrive at a satisfactory solution, This was on the fifth of June (1863). Chile refused to treat with the Bolivian diplomatic mission, alleging the threats of war as a basis. Diplomatic relations were broken off, and Chile offered elements to the Constitutional Party on Bolivia to overthrow the Government,—an offer which was refused on patriotic grounds. Unfortunately, at this juncture, General Melgarejo became President of Bolivia and through him secured the rescisión of the law of June 5, 1863; and after that, Chile Got the Bolivians to propose a series of formulas for settling the question of limits between Bolivia and Chile. The Bolivian Dictator, through Chilean influence, proposed then to Perú the rectifications of the boundary between these two countries, through Moquegua or Arica (manifestly Peruvian) in order to leave all of Atacama in the hands of Chile.

Simultaneously, Peru lent its good offices to Chile and Ecuador against aggressions of Spain when Valparaíso was bombarded by the Spanish fleet. Chile began to act on and even better plan shortly thereafter when it augmented little by little its naval power with the view to becoming superior to Peru, and then by force take the rich guano and

Nitrate lands of Atacama and Tarapacá. Chile had to rise large loans, which it negotiated rather successfully; employed German officers for instruction in its army, and English seamen for its navy. Its exports of nitrates to Liverpool, Havre, Hamburg and New York gave it greater commercial rating abroad.

Peru kept track of all these activities but did nothing to increase its own army and navy proportionately; nor did it denounce Chilean diplomacy nor high-handed methods. It preferred its normal course of peace and good will with other nations. It did not even oppose the treaty signed by the Bolivian dictator, General Melgarejo, between Bolivia and Chile (August 10, 1866). It was precisely this treaty which opened to Chile her road to conquest and monopoly of the nitrates of Atacama and Tarapacá. Amongst the clauses of the treaty were several which were later on the matter of controversy. The first of these refers to the division in equal parts between Bolivia and Chile of the products extracted from the guano deposits at Mejillones and of such other deposits that should be discovered after the treaty was signed and ratified in the territory between latitude 23° and 25° South. Provision was

also made to divide the export duties on minerals exported from this region. A second clause motivating difficulties was the one relative to the establishing by Bolivia as its sole port on the Pacific, of Mejillones, Chile reserving the right to appoint one or more agents to supervise the customs' duties at this port. A third clause which caused differences was the offer of Bolivia to give an indemnity of 80,000 pesos to the first to exploit the guano deposits of Mejillones-Chilean citizens.

Scarcely was this treaty signed, when Chile proclaimed its treaty of thirteen years before with Argentine Republic (August 30, 1853). At that moment relations between the Argentine and Brazil were so strained, that an ultimatum was expected at any moment. Chile sent Diego Barros Arana, enemy of the Argentine, to Brazil with instructions to arrange an alliance with Chile against Argentine. At the same time it sent William Blest Gana to Buenos Aires with different instructions. It is difficult to see how these conflicting instructions were intended for anything less than a deep desire to foment a war, in which Chile would reap the benefit in boundary extensions. But Argentine and Brazil arranged their difficulties without going to war.

Then apparently it was discovered, by a declaration of the Brazilian ministry of Foreign Affairs that Chile had offered spontaneously her material aid.

As war did not materialize here, Chile fomented trouble with Bolivia over the interpretation of divers clauses in the treaty of 1866. At this point, Bolivia sought a treaty of defensive alliance with Peru. By this treaty both republics stated as their objective "guarantee mutually their independence, sovereignty and integrity, and defend mutually each other against external aggression". (February 6, 1873). The treaty went even further, It was stipulated that every means possible should be tried to prevent rupture of hostilities or terminate a war, and as the most effective means, submit the dispute if possible to a third power for arbitration. Another clause prohibits these two nations to permit a protectorate or the exercise of sovereignty by a third power in their respective territories, as also prohibition to cede territory except in the rectifications of limits between two countries. Even with respect to limits and other territory arrangements, it was agreed not to make new treaties with a third power without giving notice previously to the other. Another article looked toward diplomatic

action in securing the adhesion of other powers to this treaty, pretty much as the effort of Bryan in President Wilson's Cabinet to secure such arbitration treaties between the United States and other powers. The great difference consisted here in the circumstance that Mr. Bryan had the energy and the facilities to secure these treaties; Bolivia and Peru, did not.

Chile has tried to make the world believe that this defensive alliance and the various other principles embodied in this treaty, were with a view of taking away from Chile her prestige and even her independence. Yet nothing could be further the from mark.

There is no doubt now that Chilean statesmen knew in detail the exact provisions of this treaty; these same statesmen demanded a modification of the treaty or boundary lines of 1866 with Bolivia. Chile secured two new treaties as the results of her demands—August 6, 1874—and a complementary treaty of the same date. According to these it was decreed that: (a) there should be a community of interests in the guano deposits already in exploitation or to be discovered; (b) there should be a limit as to export duties and other fiscal contributions in favor of Chileans and Chilean capital; (c) there should not be any

import duty in Chilean products imported through the Bolivian coast port, in addition to an indemnity for Chile's renunciation of its rights to minerals to be discovered in the region between latitud 23° and 25 South; (d) any difficulties should be submitted to arbitration.

In 1876 Chile continued discussions as to a treaty referring to boundary lines with the Argentine. The line agreed upon was the "Cordillera of the Andes", rather ambiguous as was proved later on, when the two nations had to revert almost to war, to interpret this phrase. The treaty was not signed, however, having denounced it in Chile, in May 1878. It was merely Chile's plan to procrastinate and through dilatory diplomacy, make the years pass in order to consolidate its interests in the disputed area, and making use of the treaty of 1874 with Bolivia as a basis.

The Argentine Executive denounced this act of perfidy to Congress, stating that the Argentine nation remains in possession of its rights, knows how to sustain them firmly, and lets all America know that there is a people that will make itself respected".

Chile was perfectly prepared for an armed

conflict in 1879, so was Germany in August 1914 when it expected an easy victory and world domination. Chile's plan apparently consisted in intimidating the Argentine and then conquer Bolivia and Peru. Only the Argentine did not permit itself to be hoodwinked this time. Diplomatic relations were broken off between Argentine and Chile, the former sent a strong squadron to the region of the disputed territory, and took possession with all the solemnities of the case. Before this incident, the swagger of Chile made everyone believe that war would result immediately, as Chile seemed only desirous of a good pretext for entering into a war. It is true that various elements reacted in favor of war; it is also true that the Chilean government sent a Chilean squadron toward the Argentine squadron, which had remained anchored in the Santa Cruz River, in the disputed territory. But it seems that the Chilean squadron got only as far as Coronel. The Chilean government was in a deep dilemma. On the one hand its diplomacy, too ambitious and too intemperate, had caused it to overreach itself causing many complications from which it could not see its own way to back down; on the other hand the excitement caused in the public opinion of Chile

required violent, indeed, warlike measures. How could both extremes be reconciled without having Chilean statesmen lose prestige? Avoid war seemed absolutely impossible, but such an act against a more powerful neighbor, such as the Argentine, was almost suicidal. Hence, only one other solution remained, viz; to direct war against another and weaker nation, which would offer at least, probabilities of triumph and gain. This Chile proceeded to do. It found its victims, Peru and Bolivia, in a state of anarchy.

Bolivia had imposed by law an export duty of ten centavos for quintal or hundredweight of nitrates taken from its territory. Chile denounced this law, demanding its derogation within twenty-four hours, notwithstanding the fact that the Bolivian Congress was in recess at the moment.

Bolivia was about in the condition of Serbia at the fateful moment of July 1914, when Austria presented perentory demands. Chile refused to have the matter settled by arbitration, although bound to do so by the treaty of 1874. War ensued.

Within a few days, the shores of Bolivian territory were invaded by Chilean soldiers. Antofagasta was blockaded by a cruiser. Peru offered its

friendly services, but these were curtly refused. It is now known that there was not a doubtful moment amongst the Chilean statesmen of the time as to the outcome of the war (see "Diplomatic Pages, by Javier Vial Solar, Santiago de Chile, 1900).

Added to the war-like agitation in Chile, was the desire to possess the nitrate fields of Antofagasta, because Chilean prosperity and greatness as a nation, depended on these. (See the speech of the Chilean Senator Zañartu, April 2, 1879; and Diplomatic circular of the Secretary of State, 1879).

Chile's declaration of war to Bolivia and Peru (April 5, 1879) was based on the defensive alliance between these two republics. Peru at that moment was suffering from commercial, as well as political depression, and was therefore incapable of presenting a solid front to the enemy. Its military equipment was entirely inadequate, and moreover, there was not time enough to secure more from abroad. Military reverses, were the order of the day, for both republics against Chilean aggression. How similar all this sounds to one who has witnessed the recent great World War with Germany victorious on the field at the outset! Peru was able to raise eight thousand men during the progress of the

war; and it possessed four war vessels. Bolivia at the outbreak of the war had two thousand soldiers, which it gradually increased to five thousand. It had no naval units. Chile, on the other hand; had eight good warships, and thirteen thousand soldiers trained and ready before war broke out. It is note our purpose to enter into the details of the military campaign which was entirely favorable to Chilean arms. Anyone interested enough can read them in histories by neutral observers such as Markham, Calvano or Uriburu (English, Italian and Argentine historians respectively).

Due to friendly mediatoin on the part of the United States government, delegates of the three powers met at Arica (October 4880) on board the U. S. S. Lackawanna, in order to negotiate terms of peace. Chile submitted two fundamental conditions: (a) cession to Chile of the nitrate fields belonging to Bolivia and Peru; (b) payment to Chile of ten million dollars by the two republics as a war indemnity, remaining in military possession of Tacna and Arica until these conditions were fulfilled.

These conditions were considered too severe and negotiations were broken off. At this fateful moment, President Garfield was assassinated, and

one great friend of Peru was lost. About the same time the American Minister in Lima was mysteriously poisoned.

Peru went to pieces from the administrative point of war, and the Chileans set up government in Lima. Peruvian statesmen and citizens were imprisoned or deported; and shortly thereafter there was thrust upon a chaotic country the famous treaty of Ancón, treaty which encloses the renowned retention of Tacna and Arica, or in other words is a second despoliation of rich mineral territories (the case of Alsace and Lorraine over again) from a beaten nation.

An excellent exposition of the treaty of Ancón may be found in the Annual Report of the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs for 1883. From this source, as well as from authentic documents of the Acting President of Peru, and the mediator from the United States (Mr. Legan) we have proof positive that Peru refused absolutely to sell, cede, or permit Chile to retain Tacna and Arica. Hence the solution of the problem and the signing of the treaty of peace of Ancón, whereby Chile was to occupy the territory of Tacna and Arica during ten years, or until 1893, at the end of which term a plebiscite

vote of the people of this area was to determine whether they wished to remain with Peru or become incorporated with Chile. During these ten years Chile was to organize the government and retain control of the finances of the territory. As a complement of the plebiscite vote, the country receiving the territory was to pay the other five million dollars. In the worst of these extremes Chile would have always "earned" during the ten years of occupation a sum more than enough to pay the five millions.

As can be seen, there is abundant proof of and authentic character, to show clearly that the military occupation of Tacna and Arica was not meant as a mere bluff to the suffering Peruvian nation in order to give form to the cession of this territory to Chile—as has been the contention of Chilean diplomacy after 1893, when this country refused to permit the plebiscite vote to take place on one pretext after another. Chile wished to retain this territory as necessary to her military and naval supremacy on the Pacific—and she has done so virtually until this very day when the clarion call of President Wilson to secure justice and right for former wrongs gives Peru a chance to ask for the return of what has al-

ways been her territory. It is true that Chile in the meantime has driven out many Peruvians from this territory; it is also true that many who were Peruvians and who should have taken part in the plebiscite vote in 1893 have emigrated. Hence the fundamental structure of the population has changed essentially—and to the advantage of Chile.

Bolivia was treated quite differently at the end of the war which resulted so disastrously. A simple truce, signed in 1884, was all that was required of her; Chile even insinuating good terms to Bolivia in a vague way, depending on further negotiations.

It is important to make note here of the exploitation of nitrates from Peru before the war. The exports for decades are in hundredweight:

1830-1839	1,095,573
1840-1849	3,679,951
1850-1859	8,898,993
1860-1869	19,587,390
1870-1879	49,654,672

Foreign capital and foreigners (chiefly English) came in during the period from 1870, as did also the Chileans. The official data for 1876—three years

before the war broke out—and which resulted in Chile taking these nitrate fields—shows the following statistical evidence, which has really an important bearing on the question of Chile's demands after the war:

Value of plant (in soles - 50 cents)	Nationality of owners	Per- centage of total
8,140,442	Peruvians	46.6
2,820,000	English	16.4
2,142,500	Germans	12.4
1,984,000	Italians	11.5
1,648,000	Chileans	9.6
366,000	Spanish	2.1
144,000	French	0.8
55,000	Bolivians	0.3
40,000	Austrians	0.2

These figures have not been contradicted. They furnish positive proof that Chile could not have had the question of nitrates, i. e., dominating interests in nitrate exploitation in foreign territory—as a *causa belli*, for her share was less than ten percent of the capital invested. Certain statements in Chilean diplomatic correspondence on this point are purposely

vague, and should be read only in the light of this incontrovertible statistical evidence.

Nor can it be alleged that Peru gave up the department or state of Tarapacá (with abundant nitrate fields) to Chile after the war on the principle of *historical revindication*, nor even for the purpose of *straightening out its boundary lines* to correspond better with physical or military necessities in whose limits dwelled Chilean citizens subject to a foreign government. The only explanation for the taking of Tarapacá is the demand for indemnity for war expenses imposed on a vanquished foe. As has already been seen, this territory during Spanish colonial domination was part and parcel of Peru. Moreover, the Atacama desert was the natural boundary between two nations, different in origin, race, culture, language and political tendencies and ideals. And Tarapacá is north of the Atacama desert. Hence, the annexation by Chile was a war measure pure and simple, such as that of Trieste and the Trentino by Austria in 1818, or of Alsace and Lorraine by Germany in 1871.

It the facts narrated thus far are correct—and it is very easy to verify them—then Chile received as indemnity for war expenses, the territory of

Tarapacá, in lieu of pecuniary compensation, and that too as a demand made by a military victor. But Chilean capacity did not cease here. Tacna and Arica were occupied by the terms of the treaty of Ancon until the plebiscite vote of the inhabitants should determine their future. The same question was presented in the occupation by Prussia in 1864 of Schleswig—Holstein (taken from Denmark), and to this day Prussia has not permitted the plebiscite vote to take place. Tarapacá embraces an area of fifty thousand square kilometers, and at the time its cession to Chile, has 42,000 inhabitants. Since 1880, when about a quarter of a million tons of nitrates were exported from this region, production has increased rapidly, as can be seen from the following figures:

1890-1,026,298 tons.

1900-1,465,935 „

1910-2,335,941 „

1916-2,980,273 „

Export duties collected from nitrates, iodine and borax, from this area show the following results:

1880- 3,093,330 gold pesos (Chilean money)

1890-35,048,293 „ „

1900-50,142,830 „ „

1910-80,421,320 gold pesos (Chilean money)

1916-79,358,147 „ „

Did Chile fulfill her promise to submit to a plebiscite vote the question of the territory of Tacna and Arica? Was it to her interests to permit such a vote to take place when her principal source of revenue comes from nitrates? Why has she not allowed the inhabitants to carry out this provision of the treaty?

Chile has not fulfilled a singled essential clause of the Ancon treaty which would tend to favor Peruvian interest clauses against which the Peruvian element in Tarapaca, Tacna and Arica protested publicly and solemnly before the whole world to the effect that they would always remain Peruvians if right and justice permitted them to choose. These memorials were signed by hundreds of Peruvians in Tarapacá in January 1884; and in Tacna, March 10, 1884). (The Treaty of Ancon was signed March 28, 1884, and shortly there after a revolution in Peru overthrew the government which had signed it). A few months after signing the treaty, Chile took definite possession of certain areas included in Tarata, which geographical and

historical data prove conclusively were never intended to be given to Chile as part of Tarapacá. Moreover, the income from the sale of guano and nitrates of Tarapacá had been mortgaged by the Peruvian government years before the war for certain railroad constructions. Chile with these guano and nitrates now in her possession, refused to recognize these contract agreements, and made others to suit her own convenience, receiving the larger part of this income for fiscal purposes.

The diplomatic discussion between Chile and Peru as regards the plebiscite vote may be summarized at some length, taking the data entirely from the historical writings of the Chilean Senator Gonzalo Bulnes, whose competence and patriotism cannot be doubted for a single moment. Peru, of course, made active presentation of her claims to secure the plebiscite vote for three reasons: (1) the continual protests of the Peruvian inhabitants in the occupied territory to be reincorporated under Peru; (2) the only method that Peru had at its disposition for recuperating Tacna and Arica lay in the plebiscite clause of the Ancon treaty which it always delired to have realized; (3) Peru was always confident of the result of the plebiscite vote as a sure means of

the return of these territories to her sovereignty.

The diplomatic discussion began in august 1892, somewhat prior to the term set by the Ancon treaty for the plebiscite vote. The discussion turns on three points, chiefly the first two mentioned here: (a) the manner of paying, the five million dollars to Chile, which presupposes the idea, of course, that Chile doubtless expected a vote to occur and discounted already the result: (b) the intervention of a third power to take charge of the plebiscite voting; (c) "It seems that at that time (Chile) did not attach great importance to the keeping of Tacna and Arica, giving atleast much greater importance to the consecution of a comercial treaty, with ample custom "facilities, which would bind Peru economically to Chile in the future",

Chile refused to concede the terms proposed by Peru for fixing the protocol which was to set up the machinery for the plebiscite vote. Chile furthermore refused to listen to giving up Tacna and Arica when the ten year period came to and end. She also refused absolutely to put the territory in control of a third power until the vote should take place. She also refused the intervention of a third power to undertake the plebiscite vote. Peru then proposed

the division of the occupied territory in two sections in order to realize the vote and at the same time offered customs compensations. Chile did not answer this diplomatic note categorically; "she did not condemn this basis, nor did she accept it completely". Peru asked to have the matter submitted to arbitration, which was likewise refused. Peru then offered the following basis, which Chile's diplomatic representative accepted, but which the Chilean government at once disauthorized: "The plebiscite vote shall be carried out under conditions of reciprocity, both governments guaranteeing the correction in the voting. (January 26, 1894). In subsequent attempts, the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs went so far as to permit a third power to carry out the plebiscite vote, but this arrangement never materialized, as a change of Minister occurred at this time in Chile. From this moment the question was changed fundamentally by Chilean diplomatic activities. The occupied territories were once offered to Bolivia in part with a port on the Pacific, in exchange for several concessions. The agreement was to remain secret until both governments agreed so publish it simultaneously. Protocols were even signed with Bolivia (May and December 1895) as a result of these

activities, offering to cede Tacna and Arica to Bolivia and furnishing her money for the payment of (imaginary) debts in Chile. The agreements were suddenly published, and the diplomatic activity came to naught. Before they became public Chile had sent a special representative to Lima (Maximo Lira) to insure means of retaining definitely those territories, in order to give Chile the right to dispose of them to Bolivia. This attempt failed of course.

Finally a protocol was signed between the two countries, called the Billinghurst-La Torre protocol. It was ratified by the Peruvian Congress and by the Chilean Senate but not by its Chamber of Deputies. It never went into effect. According to Senator Bulnes "in reality the spirit of this document was the turning over of Tacna and Arica to Peru and not to Bolivia. . . . and a formula (was found) which conciliates the interests embodied in the Ancon treaty of peace. The Peruvian diplomatic negotiations as a fixed purpose from the very beginning; and ours (Chileans) all kinds of vocillations and circumlocutions. Peru's object could not change because her only desire was to recuperate her ancient provinces, having the plebiscite take place under the direction of a foreign power.

"In exchange, Chile worked one day to control the plebiscite in its own interests; another day to bestow these territories on Bolivia; another still, return them over to Peru, and naturally its action has been weak and has caused Chile to make declarations and furnish principles which are contradictory and dangerous". (Gonzalo Bulnes—Tacna and Arica—Desarrollo Diplomático de la cuestión—"El Ferrocarril"—Santiago de Chile. May 29 1900—Javier Vial Solar, notable statesman and diplomatic representative of Chile refers to the writings of Bulnes as exact.

Another circumstance which should not be passed over too lightly at this point, is the method which Chile employed on more than one occasion to create difficulties (questions of territory or boundaries) for Perú from her neighbors to the north—Ecuador and Colombia. These difficulties usually coincided with moments when Chile desired perhaps to divert Peruvian purpose from the solution of problems involved in the territories occupied by Chile.

When it was seen that the Chilean Chamber of Deputies would not ratify the Billinghurst—La Torre protocol and moreover, when the boundary question between Argentina and Chile was definitely

settled at about this same time, Chile began on another tack. In a reunion of notable statesmen (February 14, 1899) it was resolved to chileanize Tacna and Arica. Charles Walker Martinez, President of the Chilean Cabinet of Ministers, there upon made an official visit (April 26, 1899) to Arica, and conferred with Chilean funcionarios, imparting instructions for carrying out the plan agreed upon. The Intendente (Governor), Mr. Palacios, during one of the manifestations made the following statement: "I declare that we expect from your patriotic and powerful influence that you contribute to placing definitely the dear flag of our country in this territory. At the foot of the flag we shall place this honored phrase: This is the work of Mr. Charles Walker Martinez", Upon his return to Santiago de Chile, Mr. Walker called a meeting of influential Chileans (May 16, 1899) submitting to them a new plan for converting Tacna and Arica into Chilean provinces. Measures were to be taken to insure a plebiscite vote favorable to Chile should the vote overcome the head. Until then, it seems that the plan had been to gain the good will of the Peruvians resident in this occupied territory in order to have a vote favorable to Chile. But such changes of point of view can ne-

ver be brot about so easily, as history in other nations has proven again and again. The new plans had, therefore, to take into consideration the lack of success of former methods, and more active and violent measures were agreed upon. Mr. Walker Martínez founded "El Norte" which published daily articles attacking the Peruvian elements of Tacna. The Minister of Foreign Affairs undertook measures to colonize these territories—chiefly criminales and vagabonss at the beginning—to frighten and create disorder amongs the residen element. Many families emigrated, going to the large coast cities or returning to Peru. Military detachments were sent, and were given license practically to commit excesses. On the 24th of March, 1900, the Chilean Government closed all public and private schools of Peruvians, not withstanding the fact that they operated in a perfect legal way under the treaty of Ancon. On the 27th of the same month, Chile transferred to Tacna the seat of the Military Zone which was formerly in Tarapacá; and also transferred from Iquique the Court of Appeals, created November 15 1884.

The Chilean Minister to Bolivia (Mr. Abraham König, of German descent) in a note to the Bolivian

Minister of Foreign Affairs on August 13, 1900, proclaimed as principles of Chilean International Policy the two following: (a) Victory is the supreme law of nations; (b) The Chilean people, with a uniformity rarely seen amongst other nations; had manifested its desire to keep the territory of Tacna and Arica. The Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs explained this note in a diplomatic circular (September 1900), trying to blame Peru for not having settled by plebiscite vote the status of these territories. The Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs in another diplomatic circular at once refuted these contentions (May 20, 1901). In this circular we have brought to light the attempt of Chile to arrange with Peru an offensive alliance and attack Bolivia, giving the greater part to Peru in compensation for Tacna and Arica (September 29, 1900).

Seeing that these diplomatic missions in La Paz and in Lima did not bring positive results, Chile intensified her measures of repression and active conversion in Tacna and Arica, census was taken of the Peruvian population; the Peruvian longshoremen in Arica were supplanted by subsidized Chileans. The Irrigation Code of the region, in force since Colonial days, was derogated, and by law the distri-

bution of these waters were to be made by a Judge, preferring Chileán agriculturists to the Peruvians. Customs competition was also implanted at Arica a rebate of fifty percent—in order to damage the commercial activity of the nearest large Peruvian seaport (Mollendo) which had arrangements for the traffic to Bolivia. These measures were considered sufficient to place Chile in a favorable situation for realizing the plebiscite vote. Peru protested against these measures but in vain. Peru again asked for the immediate submission of the plebiscite vote, to which Chile answered laconically that it would proceed to submit the question to the inhabitants when it was convenient to its interest. Peru thereupon severed diplomatic relations with Chile.

A special diplomatic mission then came to Lima and proposed the following solution: (1) Annul the treaty of Ancon; (2) Divide the territory, Peru to retain Tacna, and Chile to receive Arica; (3) No payment of S. 5,000,000 to be made by either nation; (4) Chile rearrange the payment of the French claims according to the terms of a treaty already in force. Peru flatly refused to consider these propositions.

With a new Ministry in power in Chile, a policy

of open hostility to Peru and her interest was begun. Two lines of action were at once opened up. Chile named as Governor of Tacna and Arica the famous anti-Peruvian, Máximo R. Lira, who at once closed Peruvian schools definitely, founded "El Pacífico", a newspaper radically antiperuvian in sentiment; and began comprehensive public works and irrigation for Chilean immigrants to this region. The second line of action consisted in celebrating a treaty with Bolivia (October 20, 1904) giving Bolivia \$10,000,000 as a quit claim for the territory of Antofagasta, taken from her in the war of 1879. In addition the treaty contained provisions for ample customs facilities and the construction of the railroad from Arica to La Paz, in order to draw all Bolivian trade thru Chile, and not as heretofore, chiefly thru Mollendo in Peru. Peru protest since Chile by this act went against her stipulated obligations. for this was really an attempt to exercise sovereignty in Tacna and Arica on the part of Chile. In fact, the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs in March 15, 1905 even went so far as to assert that the Treaty of Ancon gave Chile absolute sovereignty over these territories—contrary to International Law and contrary to express statements of Chilean

statesmen in preceding years. These events produced the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the two republics, but it should be noted here that it was subsequently learned that the Chilean Minister had instructions to insure for his country the definite possession of the territories in occupation. In a confidential letter of the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister accredited in Washington (January 20, 1906) it was stated that the local Chilean authorities were cooperating very efficaciously to bring about the results desired by the central government at Santiago de Chile, and furthermore, that the construction of the Arica-La Paz railroad would help this movement materially. An attempt was being made at this time to bring pressure from ecclesiastical sources in order to divide the parishes in Tacna and Arica, and bring some of them under Chilean ecclesiastical control.

In 1908 Chile proposed the modification of the Treaty of Ancon, and incorporated amongst other propositions commercial treaty, the extension of the railroad lines, etc. Peru answered that the treaty should be complied with first, and that mutual concession would come afterward.

From secret documents published subsequently,

we learn that Chile hostilized Peruvian priests in these territories, in order to leave the "territory with religions service" in case of need. Moreover, Gobernador Lira began libel suits against pro-Peruvian newspapers in his jurisdiction. With true cynicism the Chilean diplomatic representative in Lima offered a bronze cross to be deposited in the tombs of the Peruvian dead who had defended their country against Chile in the war of 1879. A few weeks later Chile published a Red Book in which it was stated that Chile could not see any possible solution in the plebiscite question except to declare the third article of the treaty of Ancon null and void and to pay Peru the five million dollars mentioned in the treaty as compensation.

In 1909 Argentina, as arbiter, made known her decision as regards the boundary question submitted to her by Peru and Bolivia, Chile immediately intervened, procuring Bolivia's refusal to the decision and creating much anti-Peruvian propaganda in Bolivia. She even offered arms and help in case of war with Peru. Argentina was firm in upholding her decision, and due in large measure to this attitude—strictly just and legal—Bolivia agreed to submit to the decision provided certain relatively minor terri-

torial and reciprocal compensations were introduced in the agreement or arranged with Peru. This was done between Bolivia and Peru, signing a treaty to that effect, and having an international commission mark the definite boundary limits. Again was Chile foiled in her plans to embroil South American peace to her gain.

Having progressed considerably Chile's policy of intimidation and even expulsion of Peruvian citizens from Tacna and Arica, she presented a memorandum to Peru offering to celebrate under her control the plebiscite vote, and in which were to have the right to vote Peruvians, Chileans and foreigners resident in the area. Peru replied immediately (1909) offering a counter proposal to have the vote take place within three months, under the control of a third power and in which Peruvian and Chilean citizens, twenty-one years of age and residents in the provinces since June 1, 1907, would vote. Nothing came of these proposals, as Chile again refused to enter in a categorical acceptance of Peru's proposal. Peruvian employees in the customs' were deprived of their positions; Peruvian churches were closed and the priests notified to leave "the territory of the (Chilean) Republic" within forty-eight hours

as per order of March 7, 1910. Peru protested and withdrew her diplomatic representative. Just as the diplomatic rupture was produced, the Secretary of the Chilean Legation in London arrived to receive instructions as newly appointed Minister to Ecuador. He had received orders to pass thru Madrid, too his way home, to make inquiries as to the progress of the question of the boundary line which Peru and Ecuador had submitted to the arbitration of the King of Spain in 1904. On his arrival in Santiago de Chile he gave forth a false statement to the effect that the decision had been made against Ecuador, and that Peru was prepared to sustain it by armed force. All remember how Ecuador became alarmed at this notice and almost declared war on Peru. Due to friendly mediation on the part of the United States, Brazil and the Argentine the difficulty as to a war was avoided (April 1910).

From May to December 1911 matters between Chile and Peru went from bad to worse. in the occupied territories; even the Peruvian Consul at Iquique had to flee to the English Consulate to save his life. Peruvian newspaper presses were destroyed (June 8, 1911) the Peruvian social organization "Club de la Unión" was closed by the head of the armed for-

res after the furniture had been destroyed; the "Banco de Tacna", a Peruvian, was ordered to resign and then expelled personally by the same General (Vicente del Solar) who broke up the social club; and the cousin of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Edwards, was made Bishop of a Chile vicariat, or bishopric. Peruvian youths from those territories were enlisted in the Chilean army against their will.

When the European war began, there was an enormous economic crisis in Chile, and the labor element called for bread and work. Chile began to expell in larger numbers than heretofore, Peruvians from the nitrate fields of Tarapacá and Antofagasta and circulated rumors of Peruvian espionage in Chile. The reaction in the world's markets for raw materials, especially nitrates, saved the situation for Chile.

At present Chile is expolling Peruvians in far larger number than over, and not only from the occupied territory, but from the entire Republic. One authentic case consists in the expulsion from Chile of seven hundred Peruvian clerks and workmen from a single copper mine at Chuquicamata, worked under American capital exclusively. It is known

that the Chilean authorities requested this american corporation to get rid of its Peruvian employes, as was done in other industries thruout the republic.

The American company was forced to accede althe it is claimed that these men made excellent clerks in the office. And yet we live in the twentieth century! Can such measures be possible in the light of the results of the recent great world war, in which we seen to get faint glimerings of a peace founded on lasting principles of right and justice as enunciated by President Wilson? Can it be possible that a League of Nations would not at once investigate these antecedents and return to Peru what rightfully belongs to her? Let us sincerely hope that this "Alsace-Lorraine" question of South America receive due attention from the lime-light of justice, and that past wrongs here may de rectified.

Such is the breef relation of the essential facts of the problem of the territory of Tacna and Arica, occupied by Chile and taken from Peru under the precedents set forth? Should it be abregated as inadequate under present conditions? Or should the whole matter be subjected to arbitraci3n once and for all?

Let the reader judje for himself.

The "Nationalist Society" comes out strong for the following conclusions:

(1) Considers forever as Peruvian territory the regions of Tarapacá, Arica and Tacna;

(2) Considers the treaty of Ancon as null and void in view of the exposition just presented; and

(3) Considers the maquiavellan policy of Chile, juridically, as a real causus belli, and asks the intervention of the United States in order to provide a solution on the now famous terms of President Wilson—justice and right.





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